

## Message Text

SECRET

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20

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-10 TRSE-00 AID-05 OMB-01 EB-07

ACDA-05 EUR-12 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00

NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 XMB-02 /097 W

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R 100350Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

TO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9461

CINCPAC

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MANILA

DIA WASHDC

S E C R E T WELLINGTON 0960

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS SAIGON WHEN MINIMIZE LIFTED

EO 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: MARR, PFOR, NZ, SN, US

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER LEE VISIT TO NEW ZEALAND

REFS A) WELLINGTON 0918 B) WELLINGTON 0924

1. WORKING PART OF PRIME MINISTER LEE'S APRIL 2-16 VISIT TO NEW ZEALAND WAS LIMITED TO APRIL 4 LUNCHEON AND APRIL 7 MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER ROWLING AND CABINET. BRIAN LYNCH, HEAD, MFA ASIAN DIVISION, ATTENDED LUNCHEON AND MEETINGS AND BRIFINGS EMBOFF APRIL 9.

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2. ALTHOUGH NEVER EXPLICITLY STATED LEE LEFT DISTINCT

IMPRESSION HE EXPECTED ALL OF VIETNAM TO BE UNDER HANOI RULE IN NOT-TOO-DISTANT FUTURE. HANOI WOULD HAVE ITS HANDS FULL CONSOLIDATING ITS POSITION AND WAS UNLIKELY TO TRY TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE OUTSIDE OF INDOCHINA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. HE ASSUMED TRADITIONAL VIETNAMESE STREAK OF INDEPENDENCE WOULD ASSERT ITSELF AND VIETNAMESE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN POSITION RELATIVELY INDEPENDENT FROM CHINA.

3. GIVEN THEIR PROBLEMS ON THE HOME FRONT, AND THE DISTANCES INVOLVED, LEE DOUBTED VIETNAMESE WOULD, IN THE SHORT RUN, BE ABLE TO EXERT MUCH INFLUENCE ON THAILAND. THAIS WILL USE THIS GRACE PERIOD TO MEND FENCES WITH PRC IN THE HOPE THAT REASONABLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH PRC WILL BE A DETERRENT TO FUTURE VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO EXPAND INFLUENCE. ACCORDING TO LYNCH, LEE'S OBSERVATIONS ON CAMBODIA WERE LESS CLEAR AND PRECISE THAN THOSE ABOUT THAILAND. IN VIEW OF SUPPORT THE PRC HAD GIVEN SIHANOUK AND GRUNK DURING PAST FIVE YEARS LEE'S EXPECTATION WAS THAT GRUNK, ONCE IN POWER, WOULD MAINTAIN ITS CLOSE TIES WITH PEKING AT THE EXPENSE OF HANOI. THIS WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE WAY TO BOTTLE UP VIETNAMESE EXPANSIONISM. CAMBODIANS, HOWEVER, WERE GIVEN TO MOVING WITH THE TIDE AND SUFFICIENT PRESSURE FROM HANOI MIGHT RESULT IN VIETNAM OBTAINING CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN PHNOM PENH. IN SUCH A CASE PRESSURE ON THAILAND WOULD INCREASE ACCORDINGLY.

4. LEE SAW A DIMINUTION OF UN INFLUENCE IN SEA WHILE THAT OF USSR AND PRC WAS ON THE INCREASE. USG STILL HAD A MAJOR ROLE TO PLAY, HOWEVER, AND COUNTRIES IN THE AREA SHOULD DO NOTHING TO ALIENATE AMERICANS. AT THE SAME TIME SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS ALSO WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO GET CAUGHT BETWEEN USSR AND PRC IN THE POWER PLAY FOR REGIONAL HEGEMONY.

5. LEE SAW LITTLE CHANCE FOR SUCCESS OF INSURGENCY IN MALAYSIA UNLESS AND UNTIL MORE MALAYS WERE IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS WITH THE INSURGENTS. HE FORESAW NO PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO THE STABILITY OF HIS OWN COUNTRY. INDONESIA  
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AND PHILIPPINES WERE NOT DISCUSSED.

6. COMMENT: IT IS GOING TO TAKE SOME TIME FOR ALL OF THE RETURNS ON LEE'S VISIT TO BE COUNTED BUT IT IS CERTAIN THAT HIS ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, PARTICULARLY THE ROLES OF THE US, USSR, AND PRC, WILL INFLUENCE GNZ POLICY MAKERS. IN MANY WAYS THE VIEWS HE EXPRESSED COMPLEMENT THOSE HELD BY MANY LEFT WING LABOUR PARTY

MEMBERS INCLUDING SEVERAL MNISTERS, WHO WILL NOW SEE THEIR  
ANTI-AMERICAN, PRO-COMMUNIST PROPHECIES FULFILLED.  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** CHIEF OF STATE VISITS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 10 APR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** MartinML  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975WELLIN00960  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X2  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Office:** ACTION EA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 WELLINGTON 0918, 75 WELLINGTON 0924  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** MartinML  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 JUL 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 JUL 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <12 NOV 2003 by MartinML>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** PRIME MINISTER LEE VISIT TO NEW ZEALAND  
**TAGS:** MARR, PFOR, NZ, SN, US, GRUNK, (LEE KWAN YEOW)  
**To:** SINGAPORE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006